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This article considers the passage of the Children Act 2004 through Parliament.  
Drawing on recent debates in social science, particularly those concerned with 
informationalism, governance and cultural political economy, the article examines 
how welfare policies can be used as a vehicle for pursuing broader political goals.  In 
particular, the development of information, retrieval and tracking systems (IRT) raise 
questions concerning the rapid growth in the use of instruments of surveillance.  The 
aims of the article are, firstly, to analyse the use of surveillance as a mode of societal 
governance and, secondly, to illustrate how attempts to exercise governance take 
place through a particular discursive construction of children and their protection, a 
construction which presents the Children Act as a solution to some technical problems 
of information-sharing and inter-agency working in the service of children’s welfare.  
The article argues that such a discursive construction is necessary in order to 
delegitimise and obscure key political questions of civil liberties and human rights 
that are raised by the Children Act. 
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The Children Act 2004: Child Protection and Social Surveillance 
We have here what is potentially a very large-scale system of data recording by the state on its 
citizens. The system is to be set up in the name of improving the welfare of all children. The 
names and key personal details of all 11 million children in England are to be recorded for 
access by professionals from a wide variety of disciplines. The vast majority of children so 
recorded will not be at risk of suffering significant harm or anything approaching it. The 
human rights aspect of that point is a question in itself which perhaps the Minister would be 
kind enough to comment on. But even if we set the human rights issue aside, how can we not 
regard this mammoth information gathering and information sharing exercise as anything 
other than grossly intrusive on the privacy of families? (Earl Howe, HoL Hansard, vol. 661at 
col. 1154, 24th May, 2004) 
 
Introduction 
This article considers the Children Act 2004 in the light of recent social science 
debates concerned with informationalism, governance, and cultural political economy. 
It points to the ways in which these debates help to situate a significant piece of 
welfare policy within broader social developments.  The article explores how we 
might consider this legislation without accepting at face value political rhetoric from 
official government sources, how we might move beyond the remit and conceptual 
boundaries set by such discourse.  This is important because policy measures are 
never simply about technical issues of this or that situation and constituency; in this 
case, child protection and children and their families.  Historical accounts of welfare 
development highlight the role of welfare in nation-building, economic development, 
managing populations and structuring social divisions (Ashford, 1986; Lewis, 1998; 
O’Brien and Penna, 1998).  Contemporary accounts draw attention to the key role 
played by welfare and welfare policies in the governance and regulation of modern 
societies (c.f., Clarke, 2004; Fitzpatrick, 2001).   
 
The article begins from the premise that welfare programmes are intrinsically 
embedded in political projects, projects that are concerned with managing societal 
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change and that are rooted in normative perceptions of what constitutes desirable 
social development.  Welfare policies, in this sense, are technologies of governance: 
they are vehicles through which are steered visions of the ‘good society’.  
Accordingly, welfare initiatives are a site of constant struggle over whose visions and 
interests are to be realised by such initiatives.  During periods of rapid economic, 
political and cultural change, welfare programmes become embroiled in a range of 
competing agendas.  What follows is an attempt to disentangle some of the agendas 
and interests surrounding the Children Act 2004 and to consider their possible 
implications. 
 
The quotation at the start of this article refers to key issues that were raised during the 
passage of the Act.  The Children Act is, in fact, an extraordinary piece of legislation, 
containing two important sections that have significant implications for civil liberties.  
Section 12 facilitates the establishment of electronic data-bases to track the progress 
of all children in England and Wales. Section 10(2) of the Act specifies five areas that 
are subject to surveillance in the interests of the child’s welfare, including (d), the 
contribution made by the child to society.  This astonishing specification is offered in 
the context of conferring significant power on professionals that come into contact 
with a child, through the adoption of a new legal category of ‘concern’ as the criterion 
for information-gathering and possible intervention.  The far-reaching sweep of these 
proposals, allied to the electronic tracking system, was the reason for the alarm that 
was expressed as the original Bill was examined in its passage through Parliament, 
alarm that continues subsequent to the Children Act receiving Royal Assent on the 
15th November 2004. However, the Act and its implications have been virtually 
unnoticed in the press. 
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The tremendous increase in the use of electronic databases in the past decade has 
increased debate over issues of privacy, particularly ‘informational privacy’, civil 
liberties, and human rights (see HC Home Affairs Committee, 2004; Information 
Commissioner, 2005). These issues, in turn, flag up wider questions of the 
relationship between the individual and the state, of how to safeguard the privacy and 
civil liberties of individuals whilst increasing surveillance and data collation in the 
interests of various types of protection (national security, crime control, child 
protection).  The increasing use of computerised databases has been primarily for the 
purposes of gathering, storing and processing intelligence to be used by the police. 
This is part of a development of policing based upon new information technologies 
that ‘has developed in the UK largely unnoticed’ (Donson, 1998: 181).  This 
development has provoked much concern over the social impact of new intelligence-
gathering techniques, particularly in relation to privacy, as well as with the political 
consequences in terms of democratic control and accountability (see Field and Pelser, 
1998).   
 
The first section of the article outlines the government’s rationale for, and the 
objectives of, the Children Act in the context of a rapid growth in electronic databases 
for the purposes of surveillance. The second section examines the historical 
development of surveillance as a technology of governance, drawing on Foucauldian 
perspectives on the role of welfare in social governance and suggesting that electronic 
tracking systems can be understood as a continuation and development of 
technologies of governance that characterise modern societies.  Section three draws 
on the work of Cameron and Palan (2004) and Sum (2004) to examine the discourse 
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of ‘social exclusion’ in the construction of a hegemonic political ground necessary to 
the legitimation of extensive and intrusive electronic surveillance at a time of rapid 
social, economic and political change.  Those involved in the political management of 
such change develop governance strategies to deal with new situations, strategies that 
are subject to contestation.  These strategies are framed within discourses that 
reconstitute the object of governance – in this case, children and their families – and 
establish a shared set of meanings to facilitate action by the various agents involved in 
the implementation of the chosen strategy.  This is achieved by ‘technologising’ the 
politically contested issue, by translating the issue into technical and ‘common sense’ 
understandings that serve to depoliticise any particular project (Sum, 2004).   
 
In the case of the Children Act 2004, key provisions of the Act can be understood as 
forming part of a strategic political project of citizen surveillance. The Act’s 
discursive presentation as a solution to technical problems of information-sharing and 
inter-agency working in the service of children’s welfare is necessary in order to 
delegitimise and obscure political questions concerned with civil liberties and human 
rights. Such a presentation also serves to normalise the dominant (technocratic) 
discourse, in order to secure the institutional consolidation of the overall project 
through the enactment of a policy programme.  This does not mean that the 
government does not care about children, but rather that children and families become 
inserted into a project that is much wider than child protection. 
 
Reconfiguring Children’s Services: electronic infrastructures and surveillance  
In order for this insertion into a wider project to occur, the concept of ‘child 
protection’ must be redefined. It is therefore significant that the Children Act follows 
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Lord Laming’s inquiry into the death of Victoria Climbié.  The Green Paper that 
preceded the Act (DfES, 2003), published alongside the formal government response 
to the Laming inquiry (DfES, 2003a), deals with several policy areas and generates 
numerous initiatives.  The proposed reconfiguration of children’s services creates a 
complex structure that extends and modifies existing arrangements.  Significantly, the 
stated aims of these changes stretch beyond child protection as it is commonly 
understood (the prevention of physical, sexual or emotional abuse). They now 
encompass the prevention of factors that impact adversely on children considered to 
be ‘socially excluded’. Such factors include ill-health, educational underachievement, 
truancy, poor living conditions, and engaging in criminal or anti-social activity.  
 
As a consequence of this extension of harms, child protection has come to mean the 
protection of children from failing to achieve their ‘potential’. This is a vague notion 
that leaves open the question of what might constitute potential and who the best 
judge of such potential will be. The stated aims of the prevention of, and intervention 
in, the wide range of conditions that can be considered detrimental to a child are 
couched in terms of support for families and carers alongside the early identification 
of, and intervention into, specific problems.  In order to make these proposals 
effective, an integrated information-sharing system is considered necessary. Such a 
system aims to ensure that agencies coming into contact with children can maintain 
full records.  There is, of course, nothing new or controversial in the exhortation to 
multi-agency working and improvements in communication and information 
exchange between and within agencies. These factors are routinely noted in reports 
following an investigation into the death of a child.   
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However, what has caused significant controversy in this case is the development of 
an electronic infrastructure for multi-agency working, an electronic system of 
information collecting and sharing which proposes the monitoring and surveillance of 
all children.  Section 12 of the Act facilitates the creation of individual electronic files 
on around eleven million children. The mechanism for this is an information, referral 
and tracking (IRT) scheme which will be shared between agencies.  ‘Tracking’ refers 
to a child’s contact with any education, health, welfare and law-enforcement agency.  
Margaret Hodge, as Minister of State for Children, stated that proposals for local 
information sharing systems were designed to enable practitioners to share early 
information about children and young people ‘where appropriate’. She went on to 
explain that implementation of the proposed electronic system would require the 
development of a basic database on ‘all children in an area together with a unique 
identifying number that would apply from birth or if a child moves areas still has the 
same number’ (sic)  (Margaret Hodge, HoL. Hansard, 15th January 2004, vol. 656 at 
col. 897W).  
 
IRT had already been mooted for some time across different government departments.  
For example, we find it mentioned in a Home Office White Paper (2003, para 2.5). 
This was published a few months before the DfES Green Paper (DfES, 2003) and 
contained numerous references to what was then a forthcoming Green Paper from 
another Department. The Home Office claimed that:  
 
The development of IRT will enable all agencies to share information about young people at 
risk. It will mean, for example, that when a young person who is committing anti-social 
behaviour comes to the attention of the police, this information will be shared with schools, 
social services, the youth service and other agencies who may be working with them. We 
expect all these agencies to include action to tackle the offending behaviour as a key part of 
their work with that young person’ (Home Office, 2003: para 2.7).  
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When a universal IRT system was proposed in the original Bill, its application to all 
children was subject to serious criticisms. However, its universality was maintained in 
the Act (DfES, 2005) even though many children and their parents were already 
subject to considerable surveillance.  Yar (2003) points out that those children that are 
considered vulnerable are already the focus of a protection-oriented regime ranging 
from private surveillance by parents through to the development of extensive inter-
agency databases aimed at providing comprehensive socio-biographical details of 
individual children. Moreover, those children deemed socially problematic are 
subjected to surveillance through a range of policing initiatives. These include 
parenting orders, curfews, anti-social behaviour orders and technological mechanisms 
such as electronic tags. This surveillance and its widening remit has been the subject 
of much analysis. For example, Goldson (2002) and Goldson and Jamieson (2002) 
point to recent developments whereby ‘inadequate’ parenting is criminalised through 
provisions in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act that make possible the processing of 
parents through the criminal justice system and which have resulted in a ‘significant 
expansion of state intervention into family life’ (Goldson and Jamieson, 2002: 82). 
Elsewhere, Munro (2004: 180) has criticised the proposed IRT system as an effort at 
the ‘state regulation of parenting’ that was unlikely to achieve its official aims 
because of the ‘confusion and contradictions’ characterising the legislative framework 
of the Children Act.  In part, this confusion arises because of the dual logics - 
protection of society from the child and protection of the child from society – that are 
interconnected in the Children Act. These operate through the proposed universal and 
comprehensive information system, operating across the range of social and 
institutional sites through which children pass and where diverse observations relating 
to a child and his or her life can be ‘flagged’ as a concern.  Interestingly, there is no 
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connection in the Act between the flagging of concern and a duty to assess for, or 
provide, services (see Family Policy Alliance, 2004). 
 
The extensive surveillance apparatus envisaged, the numerous personnel that are 
potentially involved in recording information, and the scope of their remit, has raised 
a number of issues with respect to civil liberties, human rights and a child’s or 
parent’s right to confidentiality.  Given the sweeping set of conditions that are subject 
to possible concern - conditions which cover just about every facet, behaviour, 
attitude and orientation of a child and his or her family - this is a highly significant 
development.  The IRT proposal raises questions over possible violation of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and possible breaches of article 8 of the 1998 Human Rights Act, 
the right to respect for private and family life. These issues were raised (and continue 
to be raised, subsequent to the passage of the Act) by the parliamentary Joint 
Committee On Human Rights (2004: paras 103-116), the Information Commissioner, 
the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Select Committee, and the Home 
Affairs Select Committee (see Information Commissioner, 2005: paras 10-20 and 30-
33).  The government’s neglect of these issues is also evident in the fact that the 
Children’s Commissioner that is also established by the Children Act must have 
regard to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child when considering what might be in the interests of children, but there is no 
specific duty in relation to the rights of the child (see the highly critical report on this 
subject published by the Children’s Rights Alliance for England, 2004). 
 
These questions of individual rights suggest that we need to look beyond the 
surveillance of children and their carers, for they flag up a broader concern over 
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encroachments on civil liberties more generally.  It has been suggested that a 
widespread surveillance system such as IRT could turn into a ‘social tagging’ system 
that would label rather than protect children and would prefigure a population-wide 
surveillance and tracking system (Burstows, 2003; Hill, 2003).  The government aims 
to ‘cut through legal and technical barriers to information integration’. However, in so 
doing it dismantles (at worst) or renders extremely difficult (at best) existing citizen 
protection against intrusion into civil rights and liberties.  As Lyon (1988: 89-90) has 
observed:  
…new technologies oblige members of the advanced societies radically to rethink how they 
should be treated by law.   IT renders old approaches obsolete.  Electronic storage of data and 
text which permits alteration after storage presents almost insurmountable difficulties for 
those seeking democratic control. 
 
What is particularly important is the convergence of computers with 
telecommunications that is rendered possible through micro-electronics. There are 
controversial implications for the use of new surveillance and investigative 
technologies that emerge from this convergence (Castells, 2001: Lyon, 1988).   IRT 
systems are designed to allow practitioners from different agencies, locales and 
institutions to access individual records. In order for this to happen, computers much 
be networked.  As soon as such ‘cyber’ spaces are constituted, the liberty and privacy 
of individuals becomes significantly more difficult to safeguard.  Whilst  IRT is 
proposed as a strategy aimed at liberating children from abuse, deprivation and 
insecurity, it may also function as a mechanism of extensive, intrusive and potentially 
politically repressive social control. It could constitute another moment in the 
development of multiple ‘…agencies of surveillance and processing of information 
that record our behaviour for ever, as databases surround us throughout our lives – 
soon starting with our DNA and personal features (our retina, our thumbprint as 
digitalized marks)’ (Castells, 2001: 180).  Indeed, closed circuit television (CCTV) 
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and biometric scanning devices for smart cards, fingerprinting, iris scans, hand 
geometry scans, voice recognition, DNA testing and digitised facial recognition are 
already established surveillance techniques. Moreover, as genetic technologies 
advance the possibilities for surveillance increase. This can be seen in The Human 
Tissue Act 2004, which allows an individual’s DNA to be analysed for research 
purposes and for the prevention or detection of crime without their permission. 
 
Such developments entail potentially profound and far-reaching consequences for the 
ways in which children and young people are subjected to social supervision and 
control, and for broader questions of rights and liberties in a society in which 
surveillance is rapidly becoming the technology of choice in configuring new modes 
of social governance.  For example, ‘e-Government’ has spawned a host of electronic 
identification, monitoring and tracking initiatives, known generically as National 
Projects.  Already operational is a project that uses new technology to identify 
‘vulnerable’ children before they get to the point of offending.  The Reducing Youth 
Offending Generic Solution National Project (RYOGENS) is one of approximately 23 
projects funded by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister as a key element of the 
Local e-Government programme to ‘e-enable’ all local authority services by 2005.  
RYOGENS is a web-based system that different agencies such as the police, health, 
social services and education can share in order to record concerns about children ‘at 
risk’ of getting involved in crime, with the aim of making early interventions.  This 
proliferation of databases was the subject of the Information Commissioner’s (2005: 
para 12) warning of ‘function creep, where the use of data bases widen over time from 
that originally envisaged’.  Drawing attention to proposals for a national Identity Card 
scheme, National Identity Register and Citizen Information Project (population 
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register), the Information Commissioner (2005: para 13) expressed serious concerns, 
not least of the danger of ‘sleep walking into a surveillance society’.  
 
In such a context, should we understand the IRT system proposed in the Children Act 
as another technology for the wholesale electronic tracking of populations by state 
agencies or as a rational response to both perceived failure in the child protection 
system and to ‘parenting deficits’?   One way of addressing this question is to 
examine the wider development of surveillance and its deployment within 
contemporary governance.  
 
Technologies of/and governance   
Contemporary societies are saturated by the public and private surveillance of 
citizens:  ‘…the mundane reality is that “everyday” information becomes the basis of 
much ‘”surveillance”’ (Lyon, 1988: 96).  However, Lyon points out that this is by no 
means a new phenomenon.  The collection and storage of personal data has been a 
characteristic of the development of modern Western nation states and their societies, 
particularly since the nineteenth century and the development of statistics and ‘blue 
book’ science.  The then-prevailing means of communication (print) were largely 
monopolised by government and by newly-constituted experts such as psychiatrists, 
whose knowledge became conjoined to particular institutions.  Foucault (1979) traced 
this process through an analysis of the role of this knowledge-power convergence in 
the establishment of discipline in the operating frameworks of modern institutions (in 
prisons, especially, but also in factories, schools and workhouses).  These institutions, 
Foucault argued, are characterised by 'regimes of (disciplinary) power’ which subject 
their charges to surveillance, training, subordination and normalisation. The 
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continuity and multiple applicability of these techniques mark out 'discipline' as a 
unique type of power.  The techniques for training and normalising inmates, with 
some variation according to context, emerged during the early nineteenth century and 
were structured around the principle that populations could be ordered through 
surveillance. Such techniques became embedded across the entire spectrum of public 
and private institutions.  In clinics, hospitals, schools, factories, asylums, orphanages 
and workhouses, the principles of monitoring, routinisation, ranking, and recording 
instilled a regime of behaviours, compliances, regulations and moral-political codes 
into institutional structures and practices.  Foucault saw these normalising procedures 
as elements in the development of discipline as a means of regulating and organising 
social life, where power becomes embedded in the everyday routines of institutions, 
agencies and actors (see O’Brien and Penna, 1998). 
 
Discipline marks a mode of power which is general (the province of a very large 
number of officially sanctioned social authorities) and continuous (in that there is, in 
every institution, a rational calculation of power and how it can be most efficiently 
applied).  On the basis of mundane and routine actions, attitudes, and intellectual and 
emotional variations there has been built an extensive and increasingly penetrating 
system of monitoring and surveillance, socialisation and normalisation.  The point 
made by Foucault that is of most relevance to this discussion is that this mode of 
power arises within the epistemic shift that forms part of the transition to modern 
societies, where the development of social science and its relationship to political and 
social administration has seen an increasing movement since the nineteenth century 
towards tracking and monitoring populations. This tracking and monitoring goes from 
the moment of birth to beyond the moment of death. Through its mechanisms, the 
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populations of modern societies are recorded, coded, categorised, classified and 
chronicled.  Each individual is subjected to an evaluative regime in which every facet 
of 'normal' life is used by someone, somewhere, in order to bestow rights, assess 
needs and entitlements, and judge educational, developmental and moral progress.  A 
political-institutional network - from schools and workplaces through to social, 
psychiatric and police services - is arranged around surveillance of the beliefs, actions 
and capabilities of the entire population.  The systems of power described by Foucault 
are instituted not by openly coercive or repressive state agencies but by a very wide 
miscellany of civil institutions.  They are systems of power (or ‘micro-capillaries’ of 
power) that are inculcated into the behaviours, habits and practices of an entire society 
of people, with the consequence that the rules, codes and procedures of regulation and 
control are experienced as normal features of institutional and everyday life (O’Brien 
and Penna, 1998). 
 
Accounts of welfare that are influenced by this perspective have examined the ways 
in which different aspects of welfare delivery have been utilised in order to advance 
disciplinary modes of social control (Donzelot, 1980; Squires, 1990; Cohen, 1985).  
The development, since the late nineteenth century, of social security (income 
maintenance) entitlements and social work organisations has been interpreted as the 
extension of disciplinary power that was targeted originally at the ‘social question’, 
the interconnected problems of poverty, crime, ill-health and social disorder arising 
from the transition from feudalism to industrialism.  Since this time, ‘the family’ has 
been routinely located at the centre of political and moral panics (see Gittins, 1993; 
Pearson, 1984).  Social work then became precisely that which it indicates – work on 
the social (see O’Brien, 2004).  The development of casework in the early twentieth 
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century has been interpreted as the development of one of many mechanisms of 
surveillance and intervention into the organisation of social life.  Casework intervenes 
in the lives of individuals and families, aiming at preventative, transformative work 
by focussing on the character and behaviour of individuals. In so doing, it forms part 
of an apparatus of welfare and state intervention that structures social relations, social 
order, and social reproduction (see Donzelot, 1980, and Squires, 1990, for studies of 
welfare from this perspective). 
 
The development and extension of new technologies  - and, during the second world 
war, of administrative apparatuses - and their subsequent post-war expansion, has 
further extended surveillance so that it reaches into all aspects of individual and social 
life:   ‘…traces of behaviour; credit card activity, traffic tickets, telephone Acts, loan 
applications, welfare files…’ (Poster cited in Lyon, 1988: 99) and myriad other 
activities become subject to it.  In this way, surveillance extends to all individuals in 
their everyday, routine activities.  IRT systems, in this context, can be understood as 
one further aspect of surveillance entailed in modern welfare and other institutions, 
where the intrusion of state and state-sanctioned agencies into the private and familiar 
reflects a capacity for continually monitoring behaviour.   
 
Governance and legitimating discourses of social exclusion 
The account above is useful for pointing to the intrinsic character of surveillance in   
modern governance.  Welfare is a component of governance and is inextricably tied to 
surveillance, the latter extending more and more across the entire population.  
Situating IRT within such an analytical framework suggests that electronic 
surveillance is a continuation of techniques of governance that characterise modern 
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social life.  Foucauldian analyses are not, however, without criticism, and two such 
criticisms are of particular importance.  One of them concerns the absence of a subject 
in Foucauldian accounts and, allied to this, attributing to concepts of governance and 
‘governmentality’ a coherence that is in fact lacking.   Theoretically, it is possible to 
envisage a ‘totally administered’ society, full of ‘Stepford Wives’ citizens, robotically 
submitting to an all-encompassing surveillance and control of social life.   
Empirically, there is insufficient attention paid to the different and often contradictory 
agenda both between and within state agencies, to the compromises and shifting 
alliances that are made, and to resistance to state policies from public employees and 
private citizens.  Processes of change in relation to welfare and criminal justice 
policy, and the governance of the public sphere more generally, are on-going and 
dynamic. The changes proposed are contested, both in terms of proposed changes per 
se and in terms of the best means to achieve desired objectives. As a result, any 
initiative, any overall programme of reform, will involve different social groups with 
different interests, agenda and ideological persuasions.  For these reasons, any form of 
governance strategy has ceaselessly to be accomplished: in Gramscian terms, 
hegemony is never fully realised, but must be secured. An important dimension in the 
securing of hegemony, or securing sufficient consent for the operation of governance, 
is the discursive framing of issues that is aimed at legitimating strategies of 
governance (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Cameron and Palan, 2004; Jessop, 2004; 
Peet, 2000).   
 
In recent years, ‘social exclusion’ has provided an important trope around which are 
pegged justifications for various reforms. Although the official justification for the 
Children Act focuses on a desire to respond to the Laming Report, the opportunity to 
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harness several  ‘social problems’ to its remit was evident before the publication of 
the Green Paper. As a result, the reams of documentation issuing from the DfES on 
the eventual publication of the Green Paper made much reference to the protection of 
children ‘at risk’ from the various ills attributed to ‘social exclusion’. Also, during the 
passage of the Act the retention of the clause relating to a child’s ‘contribution to 
society’ was vigorously defended against numerous criticisms: 
We do not agree that the databases should be restricted only to the purpose of safeguarding 
and promoting the welfare of children. They are not primarily a child protection measure. 
They aim to enable information sharing so that a preventive approach can be taken, through 
early identification of the needs of children, in order to promote their well-being. There is an 
implied duty in Clauses 6 and 7 for practitioners working across the range of children's 
services to share information to fulfill their duties. That should include services in relation to 
education and training, social and economic well-being and the child's contribution to society: 
that is the full range of positive outcomes for children as reflected in the objectives set out in 
Clause 6(2) (Baroness Ashton of Upholland, HoL Hansard, 24th May 2004, vol. 661 at col. 
1094).  
 
Cameron and Palan (2004: 130) suggest that, in contemporary politics, the notion of 
social exclusion serves an important discursive function in securing a hegemonic 
political ground.  Their argument proposes that before any rational discussion, debate, 
understanding or course of action on any issue can take place, the issue must be first 
of all ’ framed’. That is, it must be constructed through narrative:  
…the participants in any debate must first generate, implicitly or explicitly, an area of broad 
agreement over how and where lines of differentiation are to be drawn…to make themselves 
heard they must establish discursively an area of common understanding (Cameron and Palan, 
2004: 51-2).   
 
Any particular debate is located in a broader discourse that ‘frames’ the specific 
discourse within a set of common terms of reference.  Framing serves as a narrative 
device that ‘persuades the reader and/or participant of the importance of political and 
social messages and requires them to respond in some way’ (ibid: 52).  In this way, 
discourse ‘constructs a ground or space on which to act politically… a mythical but 
necessary foundation without which human action cannot take place’ (ibid: 66).   
Cameron and Palan develop an account of the way in which ‘common sense’ 
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understandings are achieved and how they serve to construct ‘a grid of meaning’ to 
form the ground of contemporary politics.  In the formation of this grid, ‘social 
exclusion’ is connected to a narrative of globalisation and together they play a key 
role in forming the ground for contemporary state politics.  In posing questions of 
how it becomes possible to move from a (post-war) state discourse of poverty to a 
contemporary discourse of social exclusion, their work is instructive in tackling both 
external (political-economic insertion into processes of globalisation) and internal 
(domestic policy) orientations of state politics.   
 
Their argument is that over the past two decades we have seen a transformation of the 
state. This has been from the post-war, welfare–orientated, Keynesian, nation-state to 
a ‘market’ or ‘competition’ state that is situated within a highly competitive, 
globalised economic environment.  In this environment, citizens contribute to the 
common good not by collectively pooling resources against common risks but by 
individually producing and consuming economic goods and services.  Social 
exclusion: 
Refers less to exclusion as a condition than …as exclusion from the large “body” of human 
capital available to the competition state.  At base is the notion of global competitiveness 
which needs to be internalised into the social, economic and political fabric of the state 
(Cameron and Palan, 2004: 134).   
 
Inclusion, then, refers to inclusion in a competitive economy.  Economic globalisation 
has involved various forms of economic transnationalism and processes of 
deregulation that reduce the role of the nation state in the governance of economic 
processes. Alongside this, the operation of the new economic order and the 
supranational political institutions that govern it produce central and marginal spaces. 
These are areas that are central to the global economy and areas that have been 
stripped of jobs and facilities, places that are politically and economically powerful 
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and places that are powerless (Sassen, 1998, 2000).  In short, much of what is 
considered as ‘social exclusion’ is constantly being produced by the operations of the 
contemporary political economy (Penna, 2004).  
 
Cameron and Palan argue that a consequence of this process is a dislocation between 
economy, society and state.  The ‘socially excluded’ (in this discourse, ‘social 
exclusion’ refers to the poor rather than to the wealthy, cosmopolitan elite that is 
increasingly barricaded in private estates, travelling by private ‘plane and frequenting 
heavily-guarded, exclusive shopping malls, as detailed by Davies (1990)) can be seen 
as outside of ‘society’ because the fundamental meaning of the ‘social’ and its 
normative dimension, according to Cameron and Palan (2004: 19), is undergoing a 
significant change.  ‘Normality’ is now defined in terms of proximity to ideals of 
global economic participation and consumption.  Drawing on Bauman, they argue that 
the socially excluded have been expelled ‘from the universe of moral obligation’ 
(ibid: 145) and ‘consigned to a particular social category – social exclusion – and 
processes of rehabilitation…which are themselves confined to particular spatial scales 
– the local, the neighbourhood, the community’ (ibid: 146).  This ‘rehabilitation’ 
takes place through endless requirements placed upon poor people coming into 
contact with official agencies. These requirements focus predominantly on the 
rectification of personal deficits and signify, both symbolically and operationally, 
‘…a shift in the philosophy of welfare provision away from the protection of people 
who are either temporarily or permanently displaced by the wage economy, to a new 
regime where retraining or participation in the job market are conditions for social 
assistance’ (Brodie, cited in Cameron and Palan, 2000: 148).   
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However, it is not only in respect of social assistance that such programmes operate. 
Parental responsibility orders, curfews, and other similar initiatives issuing from 
central government similarly signify such a regime. These are equally embedded 
within a ‘moral economy’, encoding and operationalising moral judgements and 
categorisations.  In treating social exclusion as a deficit in the skills, aptitudes, 
characters and motivations of the poor, neither the political nor economic system is 
open to scrutiny.  The narrative of social exclusion closes off any scrutiny, 
naturalising and normalising emerging political-economic arrangements and, thus, 
providing for their legitimation. 
 
The Children Act utilises ‘social exclusion’ in this fashion, recasting the project of 
surveillance as early intervention into situations of ‘concern’.  However, a situation of 
concern raised by the passage of the Act itself was the lack of detail that effectively 
provided the government with unprecedented power in relation to children and 
families, in the form of a ‘blank cheque’ into which could be written various and 
further powers: 
Our debates thus far on Clause 8 — indeed on the whole issue of information sharing — have 
demonstrated that there is considerable disquiet on all sides of the Committee about the 
skeletal nature of the provision on the face of the Bill (Earl of Northesk, HoL Hansard, 24th 
May 2004, vol. 661 at col. 1150). 
 
The flagging up of ‘concerns’ in relation to a child raised a set of difficult questions: 
Is a policeman obliged to register a concern about a child if the child's father has just been to 
prison? Perhaps.  Should there be a flag of concern if the child's father went to prison 20 years 
ago and has not since re-offended? Perhaps not. But how is anyone supposed to know where 
the dividing line is?  In any system of this kind, much will depend—or ought to depend—on 
the professional judgment of the doctor, teacher, social worker, police officer or whoever it 
happens to be, but I hope that the Minister will agree that the regulations need to spell out 
clearly where the boundaries should lie regarding making substantive information about a 
child accessible by others without prior reference. I am not talking about what is on the 
database as much as what the flags denote. The more information that is loaded onto a 
database, the more there is a risk of information overload (Earl Howe, HoL Hansard, 24th May 
2004, vol. 661 at col. 1103). 
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Another speaker continued by referring to the RYOGENS scheme, which ‘identifies, 
assesses and refers vulnerable children capturing concerns below statutory thresholds 
which would not otherwise be recorded’, drawing attention to its implementation 
guide. This defines what the ‘concerns’ which should trigger an entry in the database 
are. These concerns are, indeed, worth drawing attention to. They include the 
following: ‘denies part in/does not believe/commits anti-social behaviour’,  ‘non-
constructive spare time/easily bored’, ‘negative home influence on education’, 
‘criminal area of residence’. The speaker pointed out that: 
All of these and many others constitute legitimate reasons for entering a flag within the 
system. Moreover, it is explicitly anticipated that the "opinions" of practitioners will form the 
basis of flags within the database. At paragraph 3.5.3 of the information sharing guidance 
toolkit, "personal data" is defined as, ‘facts or opinions relating to a living individual that can 
be identified by the data’. I readily recognise that the judgments that practitioners have to 
make on individual cases are exceedingly complex and difficult. (Earl of Northesk, HoL 
Hansard, 24th May 2004, vol. 661 at col. 1106). 
 
After raising a number of other queries this speaker asked: 
 
That being so, how legal are those pilots?  What precisely are the business rules and risk 
scoring logic that drive them?  What protocols exist within the pilots for full Data Protection 
Act compliance? (Earl of Northesk, HoL Hansard, 24th May 2004, vol. 661 at col. 1157). 
The lack of detail and adequate response to these and other questions meant that 
nearly 600 amendments were tabled in the House of Lords.  The Bill raised queries 
galore, including technical problems surrounding the interoperability of databases, 
data security, incorrect entry of data, data overload, the ‘steamrollering’ of 
professional ethics and the situated nature of professional judgment.  The government 
addressed some of these concerns, proposing various criteria and a Common 
Assessment Framework  (CAF) (DfES, 2005; Margaret Hodge, HoC Hansard, col. 
803W, 1st February, 2005 ). However, Local Authorities are currently expected to:  
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Discuss your assessment of available data, and the views of children and their families, on 
how well all children and young people in your area, and specific groups of more vulnerable 
children and young people, are doing against the five outcomes for children and young people 
(DfES, 2004. Italics added).   
The government successfully evaded significantly amending many contentious 
sections of the Act. Moreover, the CAF will not be enough to allay concerns, given 
that it is impossible for human beings to operate without the tacit judgments and 
interpretations that mediate courses of action. Several problematic areas remain, with 
the detail to be fleshed-out in forthcoming Regulations and Guidance. Such problems 
have led the organization Action On Rights for Children to plan a legal challenge to 
section 12.  The problems testify to the contentious political ground the government is 
traversing with this Act.  The only way to defuse its political import is to reduce the 
problems to technocratic issues of assessment criteria and audit trails, and to stress the 
necessity of safeguarding the nation’s children from the various risks attending the 
actual or potential condition of  ‘social exclusion’.  In this way, the discourse of 
exclusion sets the parameters and frame of desirable action, paving the way for 




Framing the problem of child protection as, simultaneously, a problem of social 
exclusion legitimates the introduction of the wide-ranging information system that 
IRT represents. Also, introducing various IRT systems piecemeal is one way of 
overcoming the resistance that has met Home Office proposals for a national 
identification system.  Once all children are on databases and reach adult status, 
having been always subjects of surveillance with an individual ID number, a national 
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ID card becomes simply an extension of an already existing practice.  In this way, 
IRT extends beyond state regulation of parenting to form part of a much wider project 
of social surveillance.  Fitzpatrick (2001: 192), discussing the increasing 
criminalisation of social problems, comments that ‘social control, social surveillance 
and social welfare are becoming increasingly harder to distinguish’.  In part this is 
because social welfare and criminal justice form part of the same project of 
surveillance and its administrative and political logics run through policy initiatives.  
The increase in electronic data bases for the purposes of gathering, storing and 
processing intelligence to be used by law enforcement and security personnel 
preceded the Green Paper Every Child Matters, and the extension of electronic 
tracking and surveillance systems to children and their families is seen by the Home 
Office as a logical extension of other tracking systems. These developments give 
grounds for concern over the social and political impact of new intelligence gathering 
techniques, especially with respect to civil liberties and human rights. It is such 
concerns that have led government to depoliticise politically contested issues by 
translating them into ‘common sense’ frames of reference.  Nonetheless, in the case of 
the Children Act 2004, key provisions can be understood as forming part of a strategic 
political project of citizen surveillance. Moreover, their presentation as a solution to 
technical problems of information-sharing and inter-agency working in the service of 
children’s welfare is necessary to secure the institutionalization of the project.   
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